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Unipolar Disorder: A European
Perspective on U.S. Security Strategy
By DIANE MARIE AMANN*
Much has been said about the National Security Strategy that
U.S. President George W. Bush released one year after the terrorist
assaults of September 11, 2001.1 The Strategy's declaration that the
United States would strike first to prevent attack even before an
enemy possessed the capability to attack-a point in time much
earlier than when tradition would have condoned an act of
anticipatory self-defense-provoked considerable comment.2 Debate
within America encompassed multiple points of view; nonetheless,
and perhaps not surprisingly, much of the debate reflected an
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law;
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law (Martin Luther
King, Jr. Hall). This essay owes much to insights gained during 2001-2002, when the
author was, thanks to Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty, a Professeur invitge at the
Universitd de Paris 1 (Panthdon-Sorbonne), and also, thanks to Professor William A.
Schabas, a Visiting Professor at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National
University of Ireland-Galway. Thanks also are due to Cl6mentine Olivier for her
comments on an earlier draft, and to Ryan Walters for his most valuable research
assistance. A version of this essay was presented at a Feb. 6, 2004, roundtable at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, as commentary to Professor
Thomas M. Franck's principal presentation, published in this volume as Preemption,
Prevention and Anticipatory Self-Defense: New Law Regarding Recourse to Force?, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425 (2004).
1. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (Sept. 2002), available at <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>
[hereinafter Strategy or NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
2. Anticipatory self-defense often is traced to a mid-nineteenth century dispute
that followed the British sinking of the U.S. schooner Caroline. During negotiations,
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster wrote that exceptions to the rule confining
use of force to instances of actual self-defense would apply only if the "necessity of
that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation." Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6,
1842) quoted in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409,
412 (1906). Exemplifying debate about the Bush doctrine of preventive war are the
articles collected in Agora: Future Implication of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
553, 553-642 (2003).
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American perspective. This essay, in contrast, considers the Strategy
from a European perspective, one that prefers pluralist dialogue to
paternalist dictate.3 The discussion proceeds on the belief that to
study U.S. action from a vantage point outside the United States-
from the perspective of an external audience-will lead to better
understanding not only of that audience, but also of the United States
itself.
Given the events that followed release of the Strategy, this essay
reads in large part as a narrative about France. It is not only a French
account, however. France did shoulder the brunt of criticism from
many who supported the Bush Administration's call for invasion of
Iraq. Congress' cafeteria sold "Freedom fries" but not "Freedom
chocolate cake," after all, and prowar protesters dumped Bordeaux
but not borscht. Yet France did not stand alone in opposition. In
February 2003 millions of antiwar marchers filled streets in the capital
cities of the United States' historic allies, even as U.S. diplomats were
reporting that "[miany people in the world increasingly think
President Bush is a greater threat to world peace than Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein.",4 France's view thus was not an outlier, but rather
in step with the views of many in Europe.
In 2001, just hours after the September 11 attacks on New
York and Washington, the president of France appeared on television
and proclaimed the solidarity of the French people with those of
America, stating, "'Ce qui s'est produit aux btats-Unis nous concerne
tous.'- "'What happens to the United States affects us all."' 5 Less
3. See generally, e.g., MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON
LAW (2002). The approach also has adherents on this side of the Atlantic. E.g.,
Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1219, 1223-27 (1991) (advocating "critical" rather than
"paternalistic" pluralism).
4. Glenn Kessler & Mike Allen, Bush Faces Increasingly Poor Image Overseas,
WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2003, at Al; see Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or
Breaking Customary International Law?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 457
(2004) (discussing widespread popular opposition to war). A March 2003 poll found
a high rate of disapproval of U.S. policy toward Iraq among Europeans, even in
countries that eventually helped the United States to invade Iraq. Robert J.
Samuelson, The Gulf of World Opinion, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2003, at A21. A year
later the same poll concluded: "A year after the war in Iraq, discontent with America
and its policies has intensified rather than diminished." Pew Global Attitudes
Project, Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists 1 (Mar.
16, 2004), <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/text/pew_031604.pdf> (visited
Mar. 16, 2004).
5. Jacques Chirac condamne une 'Ypouvantable trag~die', AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Sept. 11, 2001 (noting that Chirac also expressed "'to the American people
[Vol. 27:447
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than a year and a half later, that same president, Jacques Chirac,
famously broke ranks with the United States. Referring to the U.N.
Security Council authorization of the arms inspections then under
way, he said late in February 2003 that "'there is no reason that
justifies departing from Resolution 1441."'" Earlier in the month he
had insisted, much to the dismay of U.S. officials, "'Rien ne justifie
aujourd'hui une guerre. '"-"'Nothing today justifies war.' ' 8 Chirac
attributed difference of opinion with the United States to, as he put it,
a matter "'that supposes a moral approach."' 9
The United States scarcely lacks for moral approaches.
Concerns about the state of the Union's morals often are voiced in
America's political arena. Interest groups that lay claim to the moral
high road often win the ear of U.S. policymakers, who themselves are
wont to defend a decision on the ground that it adheres to a moral
code. But Chirac was talking about a different morality. To the ears
of many Europeans, U.S. morality is unbending and uncritical. It
reflects its own value system; seldom is it receptive to the kind of
discourse that Judge Abraham D. Sofaer rightly has urged."
President Bush embraced a binary U.S. notion of morality in his
famous post-September 11 statement: "Either you are with us, or you
are with the terrorists."'1
It is not new for an American leader to expect others to act in
accord with his sense of what is moral. A recent account of the
multilateral peace conference that followed World War I is rife with
anecdotes of Europeans' frustration at the moral certainty of
Woodrow Wilson, with whom some commentators have compared
the solidarity of all French people in this tragic ordeal"'). To similar effect a front-
page editorial in a leading Paris daily declared, "We are all Americans." Jean Marie
Colombani, Nous sommes tous Am~ricains, LE MONDE, Sept. 13, 2001, at 1.
6. Jean Marie Colombani, Nous sommes tous Am~ricains, LE MONDE, Sept. 13,
2001, at 1.
7. Chirac et Aznar reconnaissent leurs "divergences de vues" sur 1'Irak, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 26, 2003 [hereinafter Chirac et Aznar]. See S.C. Res. 1441,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
8. Peter Finn, U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at
Al; Dclaration commune Paris/MoscoulBerlin, 1'Irak autorise les vols d'U2, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 10, 2003 [hereinafter D~claration commune].
9. Dclaration commune, supra note 8.
10. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Professor Franck's Lament, 27 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 437, 438, 440 (2004).
11. 'Human Freedom... Now Depends on Us,' L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A5
(reprinting of President's Sept. 20, 2001, speech to joint session of Congress).
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Bush.12 In the view of the British prime minister, Wilson came to
Paris "like a missionary to rescue the heathen Europeans, with his
'little sermonettes' full of rather obvious remarks."'3 That sentiment
echoed nearly a century later when Bush revived Wilson's claim that
"'America has a spiritual energy in her which no other nation can
contribute to the liberation of mankind."",14  A paternalist vein
likewise surfaced in Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy. As might
be expected, the Strategy declared, "The purpose of our action will
always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States." But the
sentence did not stop there; rather, it ended with an avuncular
promise also to act when the United States perceived that "our allies
and friends" were under threat. The Strategy next evoked the just-
war theory of a medieval moralist, St. Thomas Aquinas, when it said,
"The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and
the cause just.''
The Bush Administration subsequently called the world to arms,
claiming that Iraq was working toward deployment of weapons of
mass destruction. Many remained unconvinced; indeed, signs carried
by many who marched against the war charged that thirst for oil, not
hunger for peace, drove the Administration.16 France concluded that
no just reason for war had been established, and announced that it
would exercise its veto to keep the Security Council from acting. U.S.
12. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919 13-14, 23, 86, 90, 287, 298 (Random
House Trade 2003) (2002) (discussing European leaders' reactions toward Wilson);
John Keegan, Resolve: The Right Response for Our Times, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2002,
at B1 (comparing Bush's National Security Strategy to Wilson's Fourteen Points);
Lawrence F. Kaplan, The Good Fight; A New Playbook for Fighting Terrorism, from
Two Former Bush Administration Insiders, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2004, at T3
(approving, in review of a book co-authored by architects of Administration doctrine,
of parallels drawn between them and "Woodrow Wilson's 'crusading' foreign policy
style").
13. MACMILLAN, supra note 12, at 14 (citing inter alia I DAVID LLOYD GEORGE,
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PEACE TREATIES 223-24 (1938)).
14. Dana Milbank, Bush Lashes Out at Europe, WASH. POST, May 22, 2003, at Al
(reporting that Bush quoted Wilson in a speech intended to show that "well-
intentioned American efforts to reduce hunger in Africa have been thwarted by
European policies" limiting biotechnology).
15. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, pt. V; II ST. THOMAS
AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 221 (Hackett 1988) (1266-73) (stating that war
may be just on "the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be
waged," if there is a "just cause," and if belligerents "have a rightful intention.").
16. See, e.g., Les manifestations contre la guerre mobilisent pres de 10 millions,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 15, 2003 (reporting that millions had demonstrated
throughout Europe, and that "[e]verywhere slogans called for peace and asked the
United States to renounce this 'war for oil."').
[Vol. 27:447
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leaders expressed outrage even as they forged a coalition that in
March 2003 invaded Iraq without U.N. sanction. Nearly a year later,
Le Monde wrote that Democrats and Republicans alike still deemed
the French resistance to the United States "dgloyale."'7 Susceptible to
translation as "disloyal" or "underhanded," the term is not easily
reconciled with Chirac's profession of a "moral approach."
What, then, was the morality that led leaders in France-and
Russia, and Germany, not to mention the populace of much of
Europe, even of Euroskeptic Britain-to reject Bush's claim that
Hussein's Iraq posed a threat that justified invasion?
Another phrase from Chirac suggested an answer. "'War is the
worst of solutions,"' he said at a February 2003 press conference with
Spanish Prime Minister Jos6 Maria Aznar. "'It is an admission of
failure.""' 8 During the roundtable at which this paper was presented
Judge Sofaer labeled it "Mickey Mouse" to say-as Chirac essentially
did-that force is always evil.19 Many Americans no doubt would
agree. But many Europeans would not. World War II, one in a
bloody series of wars waged on European soil, gave rise to a morality
of restraint and tolerance, a morality of cooperation and compromise.
This morality disfavors the concentration of power toward a unipolar
source; specifically, toward what Hubert V6drine, then France's
foreign minister, called the American "hyperpower." 20 Preferred is
17. Patrick Jarreau, En pleine campagne glectorale, France et Etats-Unis tentent de
r~chauffer leurs relations, LE MONDE, Feb. 6, 2004.
18. Chirac et Aznar, supra note 7. The Spanish government, like that in Britain,
joined the U.S.-led coalition that struck against Iraq, notwithstanding strong popular
opposition; see also Samuelson, supra note 4 (reporting that 60 percent of those
polled in Britain, and 79 percent of those in Spain, disapproved of the war before it
began). A year later, after a terrorist bombing at a Madrid train depot killed nearly
200 people, voters turned out Aznar's conservative government in favor of socialists,
who soon withdrew Spain's 1,300 troops from Iraq. See Robin Wright & Bradley
Graham, U.S. Works to Sustain Iraq Coalition, WASH. POST, July 15, 2004, at Al
(noting that Spain's withdrawal prompted similar retreats by two other coalition
members); Keith B. Richburg, Spanish Socialists Oust Party of U.S. War Ally, WASH.
POST, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al (linking election results to bombing and popular dislike of
Iraq war).
19. Remarks of Abraham D. Sofaer, Feb. 6, 2004. Indicative of these differing
sensibilities, when a study of post-World War I negotiations was published in the
United States, it bore the title Paris 1919, rather than Peacemakers, its title in
Europe. See MACMILLAN, supra note 12, copyright page.
20. See HUBERT VtDRINE WITH DOMINIQUE Moisi, FRANCE IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 2-3 (Philip H. Gordon trans. 2001) (defining the chosen term to
mean "very big or very much" power, and remarking, "The word 'superpower' seems
to me too closely linked to the cold war and military issues.").
2004]
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multipolarity. A multipolar world entails a balance of power, but one
quite unlike that of the Cold War. Multipolarity imports what might
be termed a morality of comparative advantage. By this notion, all
states exist in a globalized and interdependent world. No one state is
entirely self-sufficient. Each has weaknesses and strengths. Thus it is
best that states work together toward the best common advantage.
"'Ce n'est pas du wishful,"' Chirac told an American journalist: far
from wishful thinking, multipolarity, in Chirac's view, describes the
world as it already exists.21
A state that pursues a morality of comparative advantage favors
flexibility and stays open to shifting its alliances as issues shift. 22 It
hardly abandons national self-interest, however; nor is it immune to
paternalism. Chirac himself ill-advisedly chided those Eastern
European states that decided to join the U.S. coalition for having
been "'badly brought up,' and having missed 'an opportunity to keep
silent." '23 Still, a comparative moral approach is better adapted to
interpret national self-interest so as to comprehend goals that serve
more than the narrow needs of one's own state.24 This European
morality thus speaks of borderless human rights as national interest as
reflexively as American morality equates national interest with
national security.
Europe has proved fertile ground for fostering this reflex. Surely
European economic integration, initiated a half-century ago in order
to reduce interstate competition, has played a role. Surely significant
is the system established by the 1950 Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.5 Through it many
21. Jim Hoagland, Chirac's 'Multipolar World', WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2004, at
A23; but see VtDRINE WITH MOiSI, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that in 2001 the world,
albeit "potentially multipolar," was yet "unipolar," and the "dominant 'pole,' the
United States").
22. Thus V6drine stated that contemporary foreign policy cannot be "static, nor
defensive, nor merely declaratory. Nor can it be arrogant, since you need allies-who
may vary depending on the subjects and the projects you're trying to accomplish-to
constitute blocking minorities or consensus. You need a policy that's clear, creative,
and flexible." VtDRINE WITH MoisI, supra note 20, at 19.
23. Craig S. Smith, Chirac Scolding Angers Nations That Back U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2003, at Al (quoting Chirac); see also Eleanor & Michel Levieux, No, Chirac
Didn't Say 'Shut Up', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 4, at 12 (parsing Chirac's reproof).
24. See Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign
State, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (Ige Dekker
& Wouter Werner eds., forthcoming 2004) (discussing this expanded view of national
self-interest).
25. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
[Vol. 27:447
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European states have felt the sting of being held responsible for
serious violations of human rights. The United States' closest ally,
Britain, has been a frequent respondent before the Strasbourg court. 6
France was told a few years ago that its agents had committed the
international crime of torture2V These and other European countries
have learned a lesson with which the United States has no experience:
one gets past the embarrassment of external scrutiny, and may even
change for the better for having been shamed.
Compounding these institutional differences is a difference of
perception. After September 11 the United States sounded a global
alarm: "Wake up! Wake up! There are terrorists out there!"
Though a shock to many in America, this fact was hardly news in
Europe. Britain was all too familiar with the tragedy of political
violence against civilians. So too France, whose subways terrorists
had bombed in the 1990s, and Spain, where 800 persons had died at
the hands of Basque separatists. September 11 revealed a path to
equal, interstate cooperation against a common criminal threat. But
the United States chose not to follow that route. It made little show
of consulting its allies about how to deal with terrorism; rather, it
sought to impose on others its own untested and controversial
solutions. European states did not fall lockstep into line. Having
earlier adjusted to the risk of terrorism, most made relatively few
changes in their own laws.8 They did join a counterassault against
Afghanistan, but objected to the subsequent U.S. detention of
hundreds of men and boys, including many Europeans, at offshore
sites like Guantinamo Bay, Cuba.29 And some, France among them,
26. Cases have treated a wide range of issues, see, e.g., Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981) (concluding that Northern Ireland's criminal
laws against sodomy violated the Convention's right to privacy); Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (ruling that some interrogation techniques
violated the Convention's ban against inhuman and degrading treatment).
27. Selmouni v. France, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 403 (1999) (ruling that applicant had
suffered torture while in police custody).
28. France did extend the period of permissible police detention without counsel,
but only by a matter of days. Projet de loi portant adaptation de la justice aux
6volutions de la criminalitd du 20 f~vrier 2004 (Perben II) (Fr.). England authorized
indefinite detention of aliens suspected of terrorism, but only in limited
circumstances and subject to judicial review. Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act,
2001, Ch. 24, (Eng.) at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm>
(visited Apr. 3, 2004).
29. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
263, 271-73 (2004) (discussing European opposition to U.S. detention policy)
[hereinafter Amann, Guantdnamo].
2004]
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refused to support the United States in attacking Iraq. These varied
responses to shifting situations evinced the flexibility inherent in a
morality of comparative advantage.
Relativity of this sort does not sit well with those who celebrate
American dominance in culture, law, and markets. The United States
long has assumed that it holds all the comparative advantages. It was
not the Bush but the Clinton Administration that declared the United
States "indispensable" to world order.30 Policies in pursuit of that
proclamation, such as the United States' passive-aggressive behavior
toward the International Criminal Court, had piqued some in Europe
well before September 11.31 Steps taken after that date intensified the
sense that America was not listening to others, let alone adjusting its
policies in light of others' views. U.S. dismissiveness underscored a
premise of exceptionalism: everything that the United States does
matters, first and foremost.
Yet not everything that matters can be controlled by the United
States. Just before the post-World War I peace conference began,
French Premier Georges Clemenceau told an aide, "I est plus facile
de faire la guerre que de faire la paix."-"It is easier to make war than
it is to make peace. 3 2 His comment rang true in the year and a half
after invasion of Iraq. What had seemed a quick and easy war had
given way to a long and difficult peace. Occupying forces appeared
unable to curb insurgent attacks and unlikely to effect a smooth
restoration of sovereignty. The threat that was said to have justified
war-that Iraq was ready and willing to use weapons of mass
destruction against the United States or its allies-was not
substantiated. As leader both of the invasion and of the occupation,
America sustained criticism across the globe, not in the least in
Europe. Events revealed that even though the United States held
30. Tyler Marshall, Watchword for New Foreign Policy Team is 'Collegiality,'
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1996, at A22 (citing use of term both by President William J.
Clinton and by his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright); see also MADELEINE
ALBRIGHT, MADAM SECRETARY: A MEMOIR 446-47 (2003) (noting that Chirac had
railed against "U.S. 'unilateralism"' as early as 2000, and attributing some French
irritation to jealousy).
31. See, e.g., Dominick McGoldrick, The Permanent International Criminal Court:
An End to the Culture of Impunity, CRIM. L. REV. 627, 645-46 (1999); Martin
Woollacott, Bush's team think we, the allies, crave US leadership, GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 15, 2000, at 22.
32. ALEXANDRE RIBOT, JOURNAL D'ALEXANDRE RIBOT ET CORRESPONDANCES
INtDITES 255 (1936) (recording Clemenceau's remarks at a meeting on Dec. 7, 1918);
see also MACMILLAN, supra note 12, at xxx.
[Vol. 27:447
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comparative military advantage, even though it held comparative
economic advantage, it no longer held comparative moral advantage.
By early 2004, the United States thus had reached out, however
reluctantly, to the same organization that invasion had sidelined the
year before, the United Nations. That initiative signaled a tacit
awareness that to reclaim a modicum of goodwill, the United States
must begin again to talk with others. Indeed, it must not only talk but
also listen, not only urge its ideas on others but also adapt its own
actions to the ideas of others.
Such a dialogue will necessitate a reexamination of relevant law.
There is a need, as Professor Thomas M. Franck has said, to consider
reform of the legal and institutional framework within which force
may be used.33 There is a need too to revisit the law that applies when
force is in fact used, to fill those lacunae in humanitarian and human
rights law that U.S. antiterrorism measures have exposed.34 Dialogue
requires Europe as well to engage in self-analysis; in particular, to
consider means by which the United States and other reluctant
powers might be drawn more closely to a framework that favors joint
pursuit of advantage.35 Unipolar disorder then might give way to a
33. Thomas M. Franck, Preemption, Prevention and Anticipatory Self-Defense:
New Law Regarding Recourse to Force?, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425,
431 (2004) (noting that to amend the U.N. Charter "is extraordinarily hard," and
supporting an interpretation of Charter's terms "to conform to evolving practice").
Notably, as the U.N. General Assembly began its fall 2004 session, France and
Britain, both permanent members of the Security Council, advocated expanding
membership to include countries such as Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India. See UK,
France, Germany back permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PAC., Sept. 24, 2004, available at 2004 WL 90390685; Michel
Barnier appelle d une r6forme de l'ONU, LE MONDE, Sept. 23, 2004
<www.lemonde.fr> (visited Sept. 23, 2004).
34. See, e.g., Amann, Guantdnamo, supra note 28, at 276-78 (setting forth gaps in
applicable law); Eric Metcalfe, Inequality of Arms: The Right to a Fair Trial in
Guantanamo Bay, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 573 (2003) (arguing that differences in
detainees' status call for differences in adjudicative treatment).
35. Of critical concern are Europe's effort to forge a common defense policy and
how that policy will mesh with NATO and other existing institutions. Nora
Boustany, The Case for Transatlantic Partnership, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at
A21. On means toward cooperation that deserve consideration, see Diane Marie
Amann, Dialogue entre chercheurs de difflrentes traditions juridiques: Une perspective
am~ricaine, in, VARIATIONS AUTOUR D'UN DROIT COMMUN 363, 374-77 (Mireille
Delmas-Marty, Horatia Muir-Watt & H61ne Ruiz Fabri eds., 2002) (stating that non-
Americans should look to mechanisms like margin of appreciation, established in
cases like Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737 (1976), to draw the
United States closer to a human rights framework); see also Mireille Delmas-Marty,
Le r6le du juge europ9en dans la renaissance du jus commune, in PROTECTIONS DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME: LA PERSPECTIVE EUROPtENNE: MtLANGES A LA MtMOIRE DE
2004]
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multilayered, and multidirectional, discourse.
An opening appeared to present itself in February 2004. The
adversaries of the prior year, U.S. Secretary of State Colin M. Powell
and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, dined together.
Their tite-d-tete was described as a means to begin to set aside
differences, a first step toward warmer diplomatic relations. 36  But
relations seemed not much better months later, as France and the
United States squabbled again over Iraq.37 One wonders in any event
whether, despite the stated spirit of rapprochement, de Villepin had
proved unable in February to resist stinging his dinner partner with a
final French barb on the preventive war question: "Mon cher Colin, je
vous l'avais bien dit."-"Colin, I told you so."
ROLv RYSSDAL 397, 404-05, 412-13 (2000) (discussing margin of appreciation as a
means to promote pluralist discussion among diverse traditions).
36. Corine Lesnes, M. de Villepin annonce une "phase difftrente" dans les
relations franco-am~ricaines, LE MONDE, Feb. 8. 2004 (reporting de Villepin's
statement that the United States and France had entered a "'different phase' in their
relations).
37 As this essay went to press, the United States' call for an international conference on Iraq
had snagged in part on France's insistence that the conference discuss the withdrawal of U.S.
troops. See Simon Tisdall, Guests to Iraq forum still in dark over time, place-and aims,
GUARDIAN (LONDON), Sept. 29, 2004, at 13. Meanwhile, just weeks before the presidential
election, Bush "took a campaign-season swipe at the French" by "asserting at a rally that
'the use of troops to defend American must never be subject to a veto by countries like
France."' Dana Milbank, Bush Says Kerry Will Allow Foreign Vetoes, WASH. POST, Oct. 3,
2004, at A8.
[Vol. 27:447
HeinOnline  -- 27 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 456 2003-2004
